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摘  要 
 
高管薪酬一直是学者、媒体、投资者关注的焦点，根据公司治理咨询公司


















中管理影响力的作用，并采用中国上市公司的数据检验 Lucian Arye Bebchuk、Jesse 
















































































Executive compensation is always the focus of scholars media and especially 
investors.The 2006 global investors survey which is conducted by Institutional 
Shareholderer Services showed that executive compensation is seen as a main aspect of 
three corporation government aspects in Canada UK United States and Europe.For 
shareholders what about the level the executive compensation of Chinese companies 
listed?Did they waste the shareholders money?This is the matter many investors mainly 
care about.At the same times executive compensation is the main subject of research for 
scholars.Although many scholars bring forward various theories to explain executive 
compensation,such as agent theory incentive theory and human capital theory etc.Other 
scholars researched the cause which inflence exective compensation and found many 
causes,such as human stitistics variable company scale and shareholders construct 
etc.Their theories can not primely explain the above compensation practice(the 
inharmony between executive compensation and company achievenent). This paper think 
that this is because they take a static aspect to research and did not detailly investigate the 
process of making the executive compensation by directors of board or compensation 
committee. Lucian Arye Bebchuk，Jesse M Fried and David I Walker firstly research this 
subject through the process of making executive compensation.They investigated that 
which cause directors of board or compensation committee would take in account ang 
which can limit them to independly to make decision.They aso bring forward the 
conception of Manngerial Power and think that executive have the power to inflence their 
compensation.Therefore executive can use resource and power which they control to 
inflence the process of making compensation decision by directors of board or 
compensation committee.The innovation about this paper is to research executive 
compensation through not simply the cause of it but as a process to make the executive 
compensation decision.This paper use the data from SHANGHAI and SHENZHEN 
STOCK EXCHANGE to test theory Lucian Arye Bebchuk，Jesse M Fried 和 David I 
Walker bring forward and provide some advices to decrese the Managerial Power.   
This paper divides 6 chapters. The first chapter is introduction, proposing this paper 














reviewing the compensation conception and theories.The third chapter is the related 
literatures reviewing and the conclusion and evaluation.The fourth chapter intruduce the 
conception of managerial power and review the related research about it.These research 
did not provide data to support their arguments.The fifth chapter is empirical research.It 
include data source variable definition model design. The sixth chapter is about research 
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GE 每年支付 250 万美元各类账单的“贪婪经理人”。韦尔奇太太抱怨说，与丈夫分
居后，她每月只能拿到 3.5 万美元的生活费，而这远远低于他们 13 年婚姻生活期间
的水准。韦尔奇太太已经习惯的豪华生活是这样的：住在数栋高级公寓内，享受私
人厨师和佣人的服务，品尝美酒佳肴参加乡村俱乐部活动，观看温布尔登网球公开
赛，不时可以乘坐波音 737 周游世界，所有这些账单都是由 GE 支付，甚至韦尔奇
邮寄一封信，GE 也会为他付邮资。由离婚诉讼揭出的韦尔奇的超级薪酬真相，引
发了人们对美国公司高管超级薪酬的质疑。 
2005 年《FORTUNE》对十大行业的 140 家代表性公司进行了研究，分别将他
们的股东收益率与总经理报酬进行了比较，结果相当多公司两者之间的关系是不合
理的，甚至是互相矛盾的。以国际电话电报公司(ITT)和雷西恩公司为例，这两个公
司 2000-2005 年 5 年之间股东收益率等主要经营业绩指标平均值如下：国际电话电
报公司平均股东收益率是 11％，而雷西恩公司是 20%，国际电话电报公司每股收益
年增长率是 3.5％，而雷西恩公司是 24.1%，很显然，雷西恩公司业绩比国际电话电
报公司优秀得多，但是 2005 年雷西恩公司总经理报酬为 115 万美元。而国际电话电
报公司总经理 2005 年报酬是 335 万美元。 
中国上市公司的高管薪酬情况更复杂，比如，ST 科龙(000921)的高管年薪连续
3 年蝉联中国上市公司中年薪 高的高管，2001 年，年报数据表明，ST 科龙亏损
15.56 亿元，系沪深股市四家巨亏 15 亿元以上的亏损大王之一，该公司却以 高年
薪 750 万元列沪深 1170 多家上市公司高管薪酬之首。有些中国上市公司虽然赢利有
限，但却丝毫不影响高管的年薪水平，例如创智科技(000787)，其 2005 年全年利润
约为 3000 多万元，而公司高管多达 12 人，高管工资总额达 276 万元，相当于全年














其 2005 年全年利润约为 3500 多万元，高管工资总额达 255 万元，相当于全年利润
总额的 7.2%，其中年薪 高的高管年薪更是高达 73 万元。有统计表明上市公司高
管年薪同公司规模存在一定的正相关性，而以上两家公司的总资产规模均在 13 亿元
左右，前者总股本为 25 亿股，后者总股本仅为 13 亿股，与之形成对比的是，与这
两家公司高管薪酬水平在同一等级的大多数上市公司资产规模均在百亿元左右。 
在美国出现的高管高薪和公司业绩的不协调引起了相关监管部门的注意，美国






































































































验管理影响力与高管薪酬之间的关系。本文的创新之处就在于使用 Lucian Arye 
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